> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.fast.poker/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.fast.poker/for-players/fairness.md).

# Provable fairness

Fast Poker replaces trust-me fairness with direct verification.

## The short version

Before cards are revealed, the hand commits to the deck. As cards are revealed, proofs link those cards back to the commitment. After the hand, anyone can verify that the revealed cards match the committed deck.

The dealer cannot choose cards. The team cannot peek at hole cards. If the protocol tried to reveal cards that did not match the commitment, verification would catch it.

## What the TEE protects

Cards are dealt inside the TEE. During the hand:

* Your hole cards are visible to you and the TEE.
* Other players cannot read them.
* Dealers cannot read them.
* The Fast Poker team cannot read them.

This is the core anti-superuser property: the system is designed so there is no admin screen that sees everyone's cards.

## What the commitment proves

The commitment proves that revealed cards came from the committed deck. Community cards and shown showdown cards can be checked against that commitment.

Folded and mucked cards stay private, like real poker. Fairness verification should prove the cards that mattered without forcing every folded hand public forever.

## Flat Bounty and duel evidence

Scheduled 6-max/9-max duels use private TEE hole cards and publish a dedicated duel report at resolution: selected seats, choices/round, board, both revealed duel hands, winner/loser, equal chip stake, resulting stacks, and flags for tie, knockout, and point transfer.

Normal hand settlement records the side-pot-eligible winner set used for each knockout point. Across the tournament, final point units must sum to the original six or nine points. A duel report can show a chip transfer without a point transfer; a point moves only when the loser actually reaches zero.

## What fairness does not solve

| Risk                            | Why                                                                                                                                             |
| ------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Player collusion                | Players can still share their own cards outside the app.                                                                                        |
| Bad bankroll decisions          | The protocol can prove cards; it cannot manage risk for you.                                                                                    |
| TEE compromise before detection | A real-time TEE leak is a serious threat. Commitments help detect deck cheating after the fact, but live leaks are a separate security surface. |

## How to verify

Use hand history to fetch the commitment, revealed cards, and proofs. A verifier checks that every revealed card links back to the committed deck.

See [Hand history and verification](/building-on-the-protocol/hand-history-verification.md) for the report-level checks.

For most users, the important promise is simple: you do not need to trust an auditor or the team. You can verify the math.